Following the withdrawal of the American army from New York City, and their taking up of a position near the Harlem Heights, General George Washington wrote to the Massachusetts Legislature:

Head Quarters, Colo. Roger Morris's House,
 
10 Miles from New York, September 19, 1776.
 
"Gentn.: I was honored the Night before laƒt, with your favor of the 13th. Inƒt.; and at the ƒame time that I conceive your anxiety to have been great, by reaƒon of the vague and uncertain Accts. you received reƒpecting the Attack on Long Island, give me leave to aƒsure you that the Situation of our Affairs and the Important concerns which have ƒurrounded me, and which are daily preƒsing on me, have prevented me, from tranƒmitting in many Inƒtances, the Intelligence I otherwiƒe ƒhould have conveyed.
 
In reƒpect to the Attack and retreat from long Iƒland, the Public papers will furniƒh you with Accounts nearly true. I ƒhall only add, that in the former we loƒt about 800 Men; more than three fourths of which were taken Priƒoners. This Miƒfortune happened in great Meaƒure, by two Detachments of our people, who were poƒted in two Roads leading thro' a Wood, in order to intercept the Enemy in their March, ƒuffering a Surpriƒe and making a precipitate retreat; which enabled the Enemy to lead a great part of their force againƒt the Troops Commanded by Lord Stirling which formed a third detachment, who behaved with great Bravery and Reƒolution, charging the Enemy, and maintaining their Poƒts from about Seven or Eight O'Clock in the Morning, 'till two in the afternoon; When they were Obliged to Attempt a retreat, being ƒurrounded and overpowred by Numbers on all Sides, and in which many of them were taken, one Battalion, Smallwoods of Maryland, loƒt 259 Men and the general damage fell upon the Regiments from Pennƒylvania Delaware and Maryland and Col Huntingdon's of Connecticut. As to the Retreat from the Iƒland, it was effected without loƒs of Men and with but very little Baggage; a few heavy Cannon were left, not being Movable, on Account of the Grounds being ƒoft and miry, thro' the Rains that had fallen. The Enemy's loƒs, in killed we could never aƒcertain, but have many reaƒons to believe that it was pretty conƒiderable, and exceeded ours a good deal. The Retreat from thence was Abƒolutely Neceƒsary, The Enemy having landed the Main body of their Army there to attack us in front, while their Ships of War were to cut off the Communication with the City, from whence reƒources of Men, Proviƒions &ca. were to be drawn.
 
Having made this Retreat, and long after, we diƒcovered by their Movements and the Information we recd from deƒerters and others, that they declined attacking our Lines in the City and were forming a Plan to get in our Rear with their land Army, by croƒsing the Sound above us, and thereby cut off all intercourƒe with the Country and every Neceƒsary Supply. The Ships of War were to co-operate, Poƒseƒs the North River and prevent Succour from the Jerƒeys &c. This Plan appearing probable and but too practicable in its execution; it became Neceƒsary to guard againƒt the fatal Conƒequences that muƒt follow, if their Scheme was effected, for which purpoƒe I cauƒed a removal of a Part of our Stores, Troops &c from the City; and a Council of General Officers determined on thurƒday laƒt, that it muƒt be intirely abandoned, holding up however every Shew and appearance of defence, till our Sick and all our Stores could be brought away. The Evacuation being reƒolved on, every exertion in our power was made, to baffle their deƒign and effect our own. The Sick were Numerous and an object of great Importance, happily we got them away; but before we could bring off all our Stores, on Sunday Morning Six or Seven Ships of War, which had gone up the Eaƒt River ƒome few days before, began a moƒt ƒevere and heavy Cannonade.
 
The Retreat was effected with the loƒs of three or four Men only. We encamped and ƒtill are on the Heights of Harlem, which are well calculated for defence againƒt their approaches. on Monday Morning they advanced in Sight in Several large Bodies, but attempted nothing of a General Nature; Tho' there were ƒmart Skirmiƒhes between their advanced parties and ƒome Detachments from our Lines which I ƒent out; In theƒe our Troops behaved with great Reƒolution and Bravery, putting them to flight in open Ground and forcing them from poƒts they had Seized two or three times. A Serjeant who deƒerted from them, Says, the Report was, they had 89 Miƒsing and Wounded, and Eight Killed. in the laƒt Inƒtance his Account is too Small, becauƒe our People have buried more than twice as Many. In Number our Loƒs was very inconƒiderable, but in the fall of Lieut Colo. Knowlton of Connecticut, I conƒider it as great, being a brave and good Officer. Maj or Leitch who Commanded a detachment from the Virginia Regiment, unfortunately received three Balls thro' his ƒide, he ƒtill ƒupports his Spirits and ƒeems as if he would do well. Colo Knowlton was Interred with every honor due to his Merit and that the Situation of things would admit of. Since this affair, nothing has happened. The Enemy, it is ƒaid, are bringing forward ƒeveral Heavy Cannon to force us from the Heights. At the ƒame time that they open their Batteries in front, their Ships of War, Seven or Eight of which are in the North River, are to Cannonade our right Flank. Thus have I run over, in a curƒory rough way, an Account of the moƒt material Events from the Battle on Long Iƒland to the preƒent moment. I have not time to ƒtudy order or Elegance. This however I do not ƒo much mind, and only wiƒh my Narrative was more agreeable. But we muƒt ƒet down things as they are. I hope they will be better: Nothing on my part ƒhall be wanting to bring about the moƒt favorable Events.
 
I am now to make my moƒt grateful Acknowledgments to your Honble. Body, for the ƒuccour they meant to afford me in the Militia lately Ordered to March; and have only to lament, that they ƒhould be ƒo unprovided with Tents and other Camp Neceƒsaries. Our Diƒtreƒses in theƒe Inƒtances are extremely great, having by no means a Sufficiency for the Troops already here, nor do I know how they can be procured. I am at a loƒs for the Officers Names who Command this Reinforcement as they are not Mentioned. However, I have wrote by Feƒsenden, that they ƒhould lead the Men on as faƒt as poƒsible, ƒending before them, when they get within one or two days March of King's Bridge, an Officer to receive Orders from me, How they are to be diƒpoƒed of. Inƒtructions given now, might become improper, by the Intervention of a Variety of Circumƒtances. I have the honor to be &c."

   The British continued to engage the Americans in a series of minor skirmishes. They moved onto Montresor's Island, from which they would be able to land troops above Harlem, and also flank the Americans at Kingsbridge. Through the urgings of General William Heath, General Washington directed Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jackson to take a detachment of 240 men to attempt to retake the island. On the morning of 23 September, 1776 Jackson started on his mission. The men were divided between three boats. The first boat landed under heavy fire from the British. The other two retreated from the barrage. Fourteen Patriots died before Jackson made the decision to withdraw.

   On the 12th of October it was the British turn to take the offensive. In the early morning fog, General Howe, with 4,000 men, of his total force of nearly 25,000, boarded eighty-some vessels and started the journey up the East River that divided Manhattan Island from Long Island. The flotilla passed through the narrows known as Hell's Gate and landed at Throg's Neck (variously called by Washington in his dispatches, Frog's Point) with the intention of encircling the Americans on Manhattan Island and cutting off any hope they might have of making their escape by land.

   To the President of the Congress, General Washington wrote, on 12 October:

"Yeƒterday the Enemy landed at Frog's point about Nine Miles from hence further up the Sound. Their number we cannot aƒcertain, as they have not advanced from the point, which is a kind of iƒland, but the Water that ƒurrounds it is fordable at low tide. I have ordered works to be thrown up at the paƒses from the point to the Main. From the great number of Sloops, Schooners and Nine Ships, that went up the Sound in the Evening full of Men, and from the information of two Deƒerters who came over laƒt night, I have reaƒon to believe, that the greateƒt part of their Army, has moved upwards, or is about to do it, purƒuing their original plan of getting [with an intent (as I ƒuppoƒe) to get] in our rear and cutting off our communication with the Country. The grounds [leading] from Frogs point [to Kings Bridge,] are ƒtrong and defenƒible, being full of Stonefences, both along the road and acroƒs the adjacent Fields, which will render it difficult for Artillery, or indeed [for a] a large Body of foot to advance in any regular [way] order except throught the main road. Our men who are poƒted on the paƒses ƒeemed to be in good ƒpirits when I left 'em laƒt night..."

   The British progress was stopped momentarily, though, by a force of only twenty-five Rangers under Colonel Edward Hand. Only one road, running through the marshes, connected the Neck to the mainland, and it was along that road that the Pennsylvania riflemen held Howe's troops at bay. The British were not deterred from their goal so easily, and continued to land their troops, but moved on to Pell's Point.

   General Washington held a council with his officers on the 16th to decide if they should withdraw from Harlem Heights or to stand firm. The decision was made to withdraw to a more secure location, mostly upon the advice of General Charles Lee. A contingent of roughly 2,800 men, under the command of Colonel Robert Magaw, were to remain at Fort Washington, north of the Harlem Heights to continue to harrass British transport ships on the Hudson River. (A force of nearly 3,500 under the command of General Nathaniel Greene held Fort Lee on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River opposite to Fort Washington.) The rest of the nearly 13,200 Americans would proceed northward to establish a new camp in the vicinity of the village of White Plains on the Bronx River. On the 17th of October, General Orders were issued by Washington from his headquarters at Harlem Heights:

"As the Movements of the Enemy make an Alteration of our poƒition neceƒsary, and ƒome Regiments are to move towards them, the commanding and the other Officers of Regiments, are to ƒee the following Orders punctually executed. - The Tents are to be ƒtruck, and carefully rolled, the men to take the Tent poles in their hands - two Men out of a Company with a careful Subaltern, to go with the Baggage, and not to leave it on any pretence - No Packs (unleƒs of Sick Men) Chairs, Tables, Benches or heavy lumber, to be put on the Waggons - No perƒon, unleƒs unable to walk, is to preƒume to get upon them - The Waggons to move forward before the Regiments, the Quarter-Maƒter having firƒt informed himƒelf from the Brigadier, or Brigade Major, where they are to pitch - Every Regiment under marching orders, to ƒee they have their Flints and Ammunition in good order and complete."

   On 18 October, a detachment of 750 Americans under the command of Colonel John Glover engaged the British near Eastchester, to the north of Pell's Point. The Patriots took up a position behind a stone wall as the British troops advanced. After an initial skirmish, Glover withdrew his detachment from the position at the wall. Despite the fact that Glover withdrew, he did so in an orderly manner, and sustained fewer losses than the redcoats.

   The engagement at Eastchester succeeded in its intended purpose of commanding the attention of Howe, and allowed time for General Washington to advance toward White Plains. On the morning of the 18th he moved his army across the Harlem River and then along the west bank of the Bronx River. Because of the lack of enough wagons and teams to pull them, it was necessary to haul a load forward a distance, unload it, and then return to the previous point and take on a second load to be hauled forward. The trip that normally would have taken a day, developed into four days of toil for the Americans. Washington's army finally made camp at White Plains on 22 October, 1776. Washington chose a series of small elevations on both sides of the Bronx River (the largest of which was named Chatterton's Hill, occupying the west side of the river) upon which to establish the camp. The American line stretched for nearly three miles to the north of the village. From the camp, the Patriots would have a pretty clear view of the plains.

   Washington arranged his troops with the bulk of the army positioned to the east side of the Bronx River, and north of the village of White Plains. General Putnam commanded the right flank, Brigadier General William Heath was on the left, and Washington, himself in the center. On the opposite side of the river, on the heights of Chatterton's Hill, were sixteen hundred men under Colonel Joseph Reed.

   Four days after the skirmish at Eastchester, Colonel John Haslet's Delaware Regiment attacked the 500-man corps of The Queen's American Rangers, a Tory regiment led by Major Robert Rogers. The engagement took place at Mamaroneck, along the west shore of Long Island Sound. The Americans routed the Tories and took thirty-six of them captive. On the following day Colonel Edward Hand's Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment routed an equal sized body of Hessian troops with the loss of only one man.

   Howe waited on the arrival of a force of roughly 8,000 Hessians under the command of Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen before he commenced an advance toward the Americans. Half of the Hessians were left to garrison a fortification at New Rochelle. The remaining 14,000 British troops began their march toward White Plains on the 24th, and arrived within four miles of White Plains by the 25th.

   General Washington rightly assumed that the British would attempt an assault on the portion of his army positioned on Chatterton's Hill.

   On the morning of 28 October, before dawn, General William Howe ordered four thousand redcoats and Hessians to begin marching on the Americans. They met an advance guard under Brigadier General Joseph Spencer. Their progress was slowed by a barrage of musket fire that caused them to fall back temporarily. The redcoats rallied and regrouped. Their second thrust forced the Americans to fall back. Being near the spot in the river which could be forded near the east slope of Chatterton's Hill, Spencer's troops entered the river and ascended the hill.

   An anonymous Patriot described the battle:

"We marched on to a hill about one mile and a half from our lines with an artillery company and two field-pieces, and placed ourƒelves behind the walls and fences in the beƒt manner we could to give the enemy trouble. About half after nine o'clock...the light parties of the enemy, with their advance guard...came in ƒight and marched on briƒkly towards us, keeping the high grounds; and the light horƒe pranced on a little in the rear, making a very martial appearance.
 
As our [own] light parties...[revealed] where we were, the enemy began to cannonade us, and to fling ƒhells from their hobits [howitzers] and ƒmall mortars. Their light parties ƒoon came on, and we fired upon them from the walls and fences, broke and ƒcattered them at once. But they would run from our front and get round upon our wings to flank us, and as ƒoon as our fire [revealed] where we were, the enemy's artillery would at once begin to play upon us in the moƒt furious manner. We kept the walls until the enemy were juƒt ready to ƒurround us, and then we would retreat from one wall and hill to another and maintain our ground there in the ƒame manner, till numbers were [again] juƒt ready to ƒurround us.
 
Once the Heƒsian grenadiers came up in front of Colonel [William] Douglas's regiment, and we fired a general volley upon them... and ƒcattered them like leaves in a whirlwind; and they ran off ƒo far that ƒome of the regiment ran out to the ground where they were when we fired upon them, and brought off their arms and accoutrements and rum (that the men who fell had with them), which we had time to drink round before they came on again."

   Lieutenant Bemjamin Talmadge was one of General Spencer's subordinates. He noted that the Hessian regiment was hot on the heels of the American troops as they crossed over the Bronx River and started the ascent up Chatterton's Hill.

"As we aƒcended the hill I filed off to the right, expecting our troops on the hill would ƒoon give them a volley. When they had advanced within a few yards of a ƒtone wall behind which Gen. McDougall had placed them, our troops poured upon the Heƒsian column... ƒuch a deƒtructive fire that they retreated down the hill in diƒsorder, leaving behind a conƒiderable number of the corps on the field."

   General Alexander McDougall's brigade, had been sent to Chatterton's Hill prior to the British assault to erect earthworks. McDougall's men had joined Colonel Reed's troops along with a regiment of militia, Haslet's Delaware Regiment. As Spencer's troops made their way across the river and up the slope of the hill, the redcoats and hessians in the advance at first charged right after them; but then they withdrew, apparently sensing the need to wait for their fieldpieces and the main body of the British army. To the Patriots on the hill, it appeared to the that the British might not attempt to take their position. But Howe had decided, like Washington had, that the hill, being the highest prominence in the valley, was of strategic importance. As the Patriots waited, Howe arranged eight regiments, equipped with about a dozen fieldpieces, for an assault.

   Howe began his attack with a rigorous cannonade against the Americans on the summit of Chatterton's Hill. Then, according to Brigadier General William Heath:

"A part of the left column, compoƒed of Britiƒh and Heƒsians, forded the river and marched along under the cover of the hill, until they had gained ƒufficient ground to the left of the Americans, when, by facing to the left, their column became a line, parallel with the Americans. When they briƒkly aƒcended the hill, the firƒt column reƒumed a quick march. As the troops which were advancing to the attack aƒcended the hill, the cannonade on the ƒide of the Britiƒh ceaƒed, as their own men became expoƒed to their fire if continued. The fire of ƒmall arms was now very heavy and without any diƒtinction of ƒounds. This led ƒome American officers, who were looking on, to obƒerve that the Britiƒh were worƒted, as their cannon had ceaƒed firing, but a few minutes evinced that the Americans were giving way. They moved off the hill in a great body, neither running, nor obƒerving the beƒt order. The Britiƒh aƒcended the hill very ƒlowly, and when arrived at its ƒummit, formed and dreƒsed their line without the leaƒt attempt to purƒue the Americans."

   According to one writer, the retreat of the Americans was an orderly and controlled movement, as General Heath alluded to. A cavalry charge by the British light dragoons instigated the end of the American control of the hill. The charge panicked certain of the American militia, and they started to flee; many of them were either shot as they ran, or were taken captive. Haslet held his troops together and formed a defensive cover while Reed and McDougall formed their men into ranks and began to withdraw down the north side of the hill. As the dragoons regrouped in order to launch another attack on the American line, Haslet's regiment fell into line and brought up the rear of the line as it headed toward the main American encampment.

   The British made no effort to pursue the Americans as they made their way back across the Bronx River to join the rest of Washington's army. Instead, they busied themselves with reinforcing the earthworks begun by McDougall's troops.

   Washington, in the meantime, decided to move his encampment a bit to the north, to the plateau called North Castle Heights, which was located near the New York / Connecticut boundary. General Heath noted:

"The two armies lay looking at each other, and within long cannon ƒhot. In the night time, the Britiƒh lighted up a vaƒt number of fires, the weather growing pretty cold. Theƒe fires, ƒome on the level ground, ƒome at the foot of the hills and at all diƒtances to their brows, ƒome of which were lofty, ƒeemed to the eye to mix with the ƒtars and to be of different magnitudes. The American ƒide doubtleƒs exhibited to them a ƒimilar appearance.
 
3rd: The centinels reported that, during the preceding night, they heard the rumblings of carriages to the ƒoutheaƒtward; and it was apprehended that the Britiƒh were changing their poƒition.
 
5th: The Britiƒh centinels were withdrawn from their advanced poƒts...The American army was immediately ordered under arms. At 2 o'clock p.m. the enemy appeared, formed on Chatterton's Hill and on ƒeveral hills to the weƒtward of it. Several [American] reconnoitring parties who were ƒent out reported that the enemy were withdrawing. About 12 o'clock this night a party of the Americans wantonlay ƒet fire to the court houƒe, Dr. Graham's houƒe, and ƒeveral other private houƒes which ƒtood between the two armies. This gave great diƒguƒt to the whole American army..."

   Apparently believing that Washington now occupied an impregnable position on North Castle Heights, Howe led his army from White Plains on the 5th of November. He moved southwestward, and established an encampment at Dobbs Ferry on the Hudson River. To the President of the Continental Congress, General Washington wrote, on 06 November, 1776:

"Sir: I have the honor to inform you, that on yeƒterday Morning, the Enemy made a Sudden and unexpected movement from the Several Poƒts they had taken in our front, they broke up their whole Encampments the preceeding night, and have advanced towards Kingƒbridge and the North River. The deƒign of this Manoeuvre is a Matter of much conjecture and ƒpeculation, and cannot be accounted for, with any degree of certainty. The grounds we had taken poƒseƒsion of, were ƒtrong and advantegeous, and ƒuch as they could not have gained, without much loƒs of Blood, in caƒe an attempt had been made; I had taken every poƒsible precaution to prevent their outflanking us, which may have led to the preƒent meaƒure. They may ƒtill have in View their original plan, and by a ƒudden wheel, try to accompliƒh it. Detachments are conƒtantly out to obƒerve their motions, and to harraƒs them as much as poƒsible.
 
In conƒequence of this movement, I called a Council of General Officers to day, to conƒult of ƒuch meaƒures as ƒhould be adopted, in caƒe they purƒued their retreat to New York. The reƒult of which is herewith tranƒmitted. In reƒpect to myƒelf, I cannot indulge and Idea, that Genl. Howe, ƒuppoƒing he is going to New York, means to cloƒe the Campaign and to ƒit down without attempting ƒomething more. I think it highly porbable and almoƒt certain that he will make a deƒcent with part of his troops into Jerƒey, and as ƒoon as I am ƒatiƒfied that the preƒent Maneuvre is real and not a feint, I ƒhall uƒe every means in my power, to forward a part of our force to counteract his deƒigns."
 
"I expect the Enemy will bend their force againƒt Fort Waƒhington and inveƒt it immediately, from ƒome advices, it is an object that will attract their earlieƒt Attention."

   The American army was set in motion soon after the British left White Plains. General Charles Lee remained at North Castle with about seven thousand men. Heath took four thousand men to Peekskill, on the Hudson River, to guard the New York Highlands. Washington himself led the remainder of the army, which amounted to about two thousand men, to a point below Stony Point, and there ferried across the Hudson River with the intention of joining the garrison of Fort Lee (previously known as Fort Constitution). General Nathaniel Greene was in command of some thirty-five hundred men at the forts on the Hudson, twelve hundred of which were stationed across the river at Fort Washington under the command of Colonel Robert Magaw of the Pennsylvania Continental Line.

   On 14 November General Howe sent his adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Paterson with a request to Colonel Magaw that he surrender the fort. Magaw refused to surrender. He stated that "he did not expect inhumanity from Englishmen" and that he would defend the place to the last extremity. On the following morning the British began a cannonade from their batteries on the east side of the Harlem River and from the Pearl, a frigate anchored in the Hudson River. Unbeknownst to the Americans, on the 2nd, a Pennsylvanian, William Demont, who was serving as an adjutant in Magaw's battalion, had deserted to the enemy, and Howe was then in possession of sketches of the fort and surrounding works.

   Fort Washington was basically an earthwork with a surrounding abatis. There were no buildings other than a wooden magazine and some offices. The only thing to recommend it was that the fort was located on rocky heights that might hinder a direct frontal assault. But there was no fresh water supply within the earthwork, and that would be detrimental in a long siege.

   When it became clear that Howe intended to strike first at Fort Washington, reinforcements were sent over from New Jersey. The garrison rose to nearly twenty-nine hundred. Of these troops, Magaw directed a detachment of eight hundred under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lambert Cadwalader to be positioned in the old entrenchments on Harlem Heights. Two hundred Bucks County, Pennsylvania militia from the Flying Camp, under the command of Colonel William Baxter were positioned in fleches, or 'v' shaped earthworks along the slopes of Laurel Hill. Colonel Moses Rawlings and his rifle regiment were positioned at Fort Tryon, about a half to three-quarters of a mile north of Fort Washington. The rest of the garrison remained at the earthem fort which covered roughly four acres.

   In a letter dated 19 November, Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine Washington:

"I began this Letter at the White Plains as you will ƒee by the firƒt part of it; but by the time I had got thus far the Enemy advanced a Second time (for they had done it once before, and after engaging ƒome Troops which I had poƒted on a Hill, and driving them from it with the loƒs of abt. 300 killed and Wounded to them, and little more than half the number to us) as if they meant a genel. Attack, but finding us ready to receive them, and upon ƒuch ground as they could not approach without loƒs, they filed of and retreated towards New York.
 
As it was conceived that this Manoeuvre was done with a deƒign to attack Fort Waƒhington (near Harlem heights) or to throw a body of Troops into the Jerƒeys, or what might be ƒtill worƒe, aim a ƒtroke at Philadelphia, I haƒtend over on this ƒide with abt. 5000 Men by a round about March (wch. we were obliged to take on Acct. of the Shipping oppoƒing the paƒsage at all the lower Ferries) of near 65 Miles. But did not get hear time enough to take Meaƒures to ƒave Fort Waƒhington tho I got here myƒelf a day or two before it ƒurrendered, which happened on the 16th. Inƒtt. After making a defence of about 4 or 5 hours only.
 
We have no particular Acct. of the loƒs on either ƒide, or of the Circumƒtances attending this matter, the whole Garriƒon after being drove from the out lines, and retiring within the Fort ƒurrendered themƒelves Priƒoners of War, and giving me no Acct. of the terms. By a letter, which I have just receivd from Genl. Greene at Fort Lee, (whc. is oppoƒite to Fort Waƒhington) I am informed that "one of the Train of Artillery came acroƒs the River laƒt Night on a Raft, by his Acct. the Enemy have ƒuffered greatly on the North ƒide of Fort Waƒhington. Colo. Rawlings's Regiment (late Hugh Stephenƒon's) was poƒted there, and behaved with great Spirit. Colo. Magaw could not get the Men to Man the Lines, otherwiƒe he would not have given up the Fort."
 
This is a moƒt unfortunate affair, and has given me great Mortification as we have loƒt not only two thouƒand Men that were there, but a good deal of Artillery, and ƒome of the beƒt arms we had. And what adds to my Mortification is, that this Poƒt, after the laƒt Ships went paƒt it, was held contrary to my Wiƒhes and opinion; as I conceived it to be a dangerous one: but being determined on by a full Council of General Officers, and receiving a reƒolution of Congreƒs ƒtrongly expreƒsive of their deƒires, that the Channel of the River (which we had been labouring to ƒtop for a long time at this place) might be obƒtructed, if poƒsible; and knowing that this could not be done unleƒs there were Batteries to protect the obƒtruction I did not care to give an abƒolute order for withdrawing the Garriƒon till I could get round and ƒee the Situation of things and then it became too late as the Fort was inveƒted. I had given it, upon paƒsing of the laƒt Ships, as my opinion to Genl. Greene, under whoƒe care it was, that it would be beƒt to evacuate the place; but as the order was diƒcretionary, and his opinion differed from mine, it unhappily was delayed too long, to my great grief..."

   In regard to "the Circumƒtances attending this matter", of which General Washington was not knowledgeable when he wrote to his brother on the 19th, the following is known. During the night of the 14th, General Howe transported his troops up the Hudson River, under the eyes of the Americans in the two forts (Lee and Washington). The thirty flatboats used for the transport of the troops were diverted into the Spuyten Duyvil Creek and from there into the Harlem River so that an attack could be made from the east.

   On the morning of 16 November, Generals Washington, Putnam, Mercer and Greene rowed over to Fort Washington from Fort Lee, in order to discuss an evacuation. As they arrived at the eastern shoreline of the Hudson River, they heard the opening shots of cannon, and sensed that the British assault had begun. They rowed back to Fort Lee where Washington organized about 3,000 of the troops to march west to Hackensack.

   The British assault on Fort Washington would be made in four phases.

   The first phase was an assault made by the 3,000 Hessian troops under General von Knyphausen against Rawling's riflemen at Fort Tryon. Knyphausen's troops, which included men from Johann Gottlieb Rall's Brigade and Waldeck's Regiment, crossed the Kings Bridge around 7:00am. Because Howe's plan was for all of the major bodies of American troops were to be hit at the same time, Knyphausen made initial contact with Rawling's troops around 10:00, but then backed off while he waited for the signal, by cannon, that General Mathews had crossed the Harlem River and was ready to attack.

   Knyphausen divided his force into two columns. He led the one and Colonel Rall the other. The terrain through which they traveled was very rough and difficult, and the fire from Rawling's riflemen was hot and heavy. It would prove to be the longest and most intense combat of the day.

   The second phase involved Lord Hugh Percy, whose 2,000 men, composed of one Hessian brigade and nine British battalions, marched northward from McGown's Pass to confront Cadwalader's troops.

   The third phase got under way around noon when General Edward Mathew arrived with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Light Infantry, followed by two guards battalions, who were supported the 1st and 2nd Grenadier Battalions and the 33rd Foot Regiment led by General Charles Cornwallis. This force marched against the militia led by Colonel Baxter on Laurel Hill. Baxter was killed early in the assault, and his militia fled to the safety of the fort.

   The fourth phase was to be a feigned landing due east of Fort Washington by Colonel William Alexander (aka Lord Stirling) and his 42nd or Royal Highland Regiment (aka the "Black Watch"). When it was discovered that Percy was meeting greater resistance than anticipated, and with the retreat of Baxter's militia at Laurel Hill, Stirling was redirected to strike Cadwalader's flank. Two battalions from Cornwallis' command were attached to Stirling's for the flanking move. In response, Cadwalader directed 150 men of the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment to defend his side. The combined strength of Percy's and Stirling's forces was too much for Cadwalader to stand up to, even with the reinforcements. Despite having inflicted heavy casualties on Percy's Hessian Brigade, Cadwalader, at length, was forced to accept the futility of his situation, and called for a retreat back to Fort Washington.

   The Hessians under Colonel Rall succeeded in breaking Rawlings' defence and pushed through to arrive at Fort Washington in the early afternoon. Captain Hohenstein was ordered by Colonel Rall to tie a white cloth to the end of a musket barrel and then to advance to the fort and demand its surrender. The American surrender of Fort Washington came at about 3:00pm.

   Four days later, on the 20th of November, Howe sent General Cornwallis across the Hudson River to attempt to take Fort Lee. Over 4,000 troops crossed the Hudson in a steady rain and landed about six miles north of the fort. The Americans were warned of the movement of the British troops, and General Greene began a general evacuation of the fortification. Greene and some 2,000 Patriots would make their way to join Washington's army at Hackensack, New Jersey. In their haste they left a considerable amount of equipment. It was said that when the British arrived at the site they found tents and personal equipment still in place, with pots of stew still boiling. Only twelve drunken American soldiers were in it when Cornwallis claimed the fort for the redcoats. About 150 others were taken captive in the vicinity around the fort.

   The loss of both forts was a devastating blow to the American Cause. In the surrender of Fort Washington, 2,818 men had been taken prisoner. Loss of life amounted to 53 for the Americans, with about 96 wounded. (By comparison, the British lost 458.) The City of New York would remain in British hands until after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783. The loss in terms of morale was even greater than the loss of arms and ammunition.