General George Washington's assumption, on the evening of the 29th or June, 1776, that the entire British fleet carrying General Sir William Howe's army must have arrived from Halifax, proved to be true. Before the 30th had passed, one hundred and twenty-seven ships of the Royal Navy were floating in New York Harbor. Within a few weeks, the British armada in the harbor would grow to include roughly three hundred vessels, ten of which were ships of the line and twenty were frigates.

   The British troops remained on board the ships until the 3rd of July. At that time, 9,300 redcoats were disembarked on Staten Island. On the 12th of July, Admiral Richard Howe (Sir William's brother) arrived with 11,000 additional troops. On August 1, Commodore Parker arrived with nine warships carrying 2,500 troops under the command of Generals Clinton and Cornwallis. By the end of August, Howe's army would number approximately 32,000. That number included 8,000 Hessian (i.e. German) mercenaries.

   On the American side, the number of troops was significantly less than the British. Only some 10,500 Patriot troops from the army raised in the siege of Boston made up Washington's army. And not all of those troops were fit for service. On 8 August, the General reported to Congress:

"For the ƒeveral poƒts on New York, Long and Governor's Iƒlands and Paulus Hook we have fit for duty 10,514. Sick preƒent 3039. ƒick abƒent 629...
 
"Our poƒts too are much divided, having Waters between many of them, and ƒome diƒtant from others many miles. Theƒe circumƒtances ƒufficiently diƒtreƒsing of themƒelves, are much aggravated by the ƒickneƒs that prevails thro the Army; every day more or leƒs are taken down, ƒo that the proportion of Men that may come in, cannot be conƒidered as a real and ƒerviceable Augmentation in the whole. Theƒe things are melancholy, but they are nevertheleƒs true."

   It might be noted, at this time, that while the American army was encamped at the environs of New York Island, a number of Stockbridge and Mohickan Indians requested to be permitted to join the Patriots. Their requests had been submitted to the Continental Congress. At first, the Continental Congress refused the requests. On Monday, 24 June, the Congress resolved "That a letter be written to the General, deƒiring him to put a ƒtop to the raiƒing of companies of Mohickan and Stockbridge Indians..." On the 2nd of August (during the session in which the delegates to the Continental Congress actually placed their signatures on the "engrossed and compared" copy of the Declaration of Independence), the Congress resolved "That General Waƒhington be inƒtructed to employ in the ƒervice of the ƒtates, as many of the Stockbridge Indians as he ƒhall judge proper."

   The General therefore instructed Timothy Edwards to "engage in the Service, as great a Number of them as you poƒsibly can."

   General Washington was convinced that the British would make an attack before too much time had passed. From his headquarters on the island of New York, Washington wrote to Brigadier General Hugh Mercer on the 8th of August:

"The Account given you by a deƒerter, as brought me by Mr. Tilghman is confirmed by two Sailors who came off the Night before laƒt from the Enemy; That Genl. Clinton is arrived with his Army from South Carolina, and that Preparations are makeing for an early and Vigorous Attack. They further add, that laƒt Sunday 1000 Heƒsians landed, part of 12,000, the Remainder being left off the Banks of Newfound Land, that may be expected every Hour. Under theƒe Circumƒtances, and conƒidering how much deficient this Army is, from the not filling up the new Levies, and Sickneƒs, I muƒt deƒire you to ƒend over one of the Rifle Regiments, as we have not one Corps of that kind on this Iƒland. I leave it to you, to fix upon that which you think will come with the moƒt Chearfulneƒs, and are beƒt appointed, but would not have any time loƒt. The Quarter Maƒter may ƒet out immediately to prepare for them; from all accounts the grand Attack will be made here, and at Long Iƒland."

   Despite General Washington's concerns at the beginning of August, the "grand Attack" would not occur before nearly two weeks had passed. On 15 August he wrote to the Congress with information that a great number of boats had been passing and repassing the Narrows, and that it appeared that British General Howe intended to land a part of his forces on Long Island, but that it had not happened thus far. The General, no doubt, was growing more anxious by the minute as the two armies waited and watched each other. In a letter dated 17 August, he wrote to the Congress:

"The circumƒtances of the two Armies having undergone no material Alteration ƒince I had the honor of writing you laƒt, I have nothing particular or Important to communicate reƒpecting them."

   The General did provide for the delegates assembled in Congress an account of an attempt by the Americans to set fire to the British ships in the harbor.

"two of our Fire Veƒsels attempted laƒt night to burn the Enemy's Ships and Tenders up the River...they burnt one Tender, and one of them boarded the Phoenix and was grapled with her for near ten Minutes, but ƒhe cleared herƒelf."

   Washington divided his forces into five divisions. Three of the divisions were positioned on Manhattan Island around the city of New York, one was positioned on Long Island at Brooklyn Heights, and the fifth was garrisoned Fort Washington at the northern end of Manhattan Island. The British remained at their encampment on Staten Island.

   Finally, on 22 August, the British made their move. Howe began to move his troops from Staten Island across to Gravesend. Four thousand of Howe's troops were ferried across the Narrows that separated Staten Island from the southern tip of Long Island. On Long Island, the British troops met with only a slight bit of opposition. Colonel Edward Hand and two hundred riflemen from Pennsylvania were positioned near Gravesend, but they withdrew as the British advanced. Although they fired only a few shots at the British, Hand's men burned supplies and crops as they retreated.

   According to a letter sent by General Washington to the Continental Congress:

"Yeƒterday Morning and in the courƒe of the preceeding night, a conƒiderable body of the Enemy, amounting by report to eight or nine thouƒand, and theƒe all Britiƒh, Landed from the Tranƒport Ships mentioned in my laƒt, at Graveƒend Bay on Long Iƒland, and have approached within three miles of our Lines, having marched acroƒs the Low, cleared Grounds, near the Woods at Flat Buƒh where they halted, from my laƒt Intelligence.
 
"I have detached from hence, Six Battalions, as a reinforcement to our Troops there, which are all I can ƒpare at this Time, not knowing but the fleet may move up with the remainder of their Army and make an Attack here on the next flood Tide. If they do not, I ƒhall ƒend a further reinforcement ƒhould it be neceƒsary, and have ordered five Battalions more to be in readineƒs for that purpoƒe. I have no doubt but a little Time will produce ƒome Important events.

   A long ridge running east to west, the Heights of Guan, divided Long Island. Four gaps in that ridge provided passage from the southern end, where Howe’s troops had landed. To throw off the Americans, Howe initially led his troops toward the Flatbush and Bedford Passes, but his plan was to divide his troops and take the majority through Jamaica Pass. The British established a camp near the village of Flatbush, about four miles from the point of landing. According to a Hessian officer, they slept quietly all night despite the fact that they believed the Americans "might have made it very naƒty for us."

   In order for the main body of the British troops to safely cover the distance to gain access to the Brooklyn Heights through the Jamaica Pass, Howe's plan called for engaging the Patriots at the Flatbush and Bedford Passes with a steady but restrained fire. It was hoped by Howe that the Americans would misinterpret his restraint, and become overly confident. John Sullivan, in command of the troops stationed at the Brooklyn Heights, believed Howe’s ruse. As a result, Sullivan directed most of the Patriots into position to the north of the Flatbush and Bedford Passes. Through the morning of the 23rd, the Patriots engaged the redcoats in a series of minor, but sharp skirmishing.

   The Hessian officer would write of the skirmishing:

"The rebels approached twice, fired howitzers and uƒed grape and ball... The rebels have ƒome very good markƒmen, but ƒome of them have wretched guns, and moƒt of them ƒhoot crooked. But they are clever at hunters' wiles. They climb trees, they crawl forward on their bellies for one hundred and fifty paces, ƒhoot, and go quickly back again. They make themƒelves ƒhelters of boughs, &c. But today they are much put out by our green-coats, for we don't let our fellows fire unleƒs they can get good aim at a man, ƒo that they dare not undertake anything more againƒt us."

   For a time it appeared that the Americans might thwart Howe's plans. Hand's Pennsylvanian riflemen forced the Hessians, under Colonel Carl von Donop, to retreat from their outpost near the Bedford Pass. But the Hessians rallied and the Americans retreated in turn.

   Washington traveled over to Long Island on the 23rd to observe the situation. He disagreed with the way that Sullivan was handling the Patriot forces; and although he had no proof, he had the feeling that the British were planning a two-pronged attack. The General expected one attack against Brooklyn Heights and the other attack to be aimed directly at Manhattan Island. For that reason, he did not want to send too many of the Patriot troops across to Long Island. On the 24th, Major General Israel Putnam was sent over to replace Sullivan as general commander of the forces on Long Island. Sullivan was to serve as his second in command. Also sent to reinforce the American lines on Long Island were the troops under Major General William Alexander, the self-proclaimed "Lord" Stirling. The Patriot force on Long Island now numbered roughly 5,800.

   As reports of the British numbers made their way to Washington's headquarters, and as the movements of the British indicated that they intended to make the defences around Brooklyn their primary target, it became clear to him that he would need to increase his reinforcements on Long Island. On the 26th of August he directed more of the troops, then on Manhattan Island, across the river. The additional men brought the Patriot force defending the Brooklyn Heights to 9,000 men. General Putnam established two lines of defence. 5,000 men were positioned along a line of breastworks that stretched from Wallabout Bay to the Gawanus Bay for the purpose of shielding the village of Brooklyn from the east. Putnam, himself, commanded that force. A second, outer line was established along the northwest edge of the Heights of Guan at the various mountain passes. About 1,600 men under the command of "Lord" Stirling were positioned at the gap through which the Gowanus Road traveled north toward Brooklyn. About a thousand Patriots were positioned on the northwest of the Flatbush Pass, covering the Flatbush and Bedford Roads, and were commanded by Sullivan. The American left was primarily made up of Colonel Samuel Miles' Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment.

   General Washington may have felt a little better with the increase of troops on Long Island, but he had another thing to worry about. Over the 24th and 25th it rained. The General issued a General Order on the 26th:

"The General is very anxious for the ƒtate of the arms and ammunition, the frequent Rains giving to much reaƒon to fear they may ƒuffer; He therefore earneƒtly enjoins officers and men to be particularly attentive to it and have them in the beƒt order."

   British General James Grant, early on the 26th, edged a force of some 5,000 redcoats toward the Patriots led by Stirling. During that afternoon, two brigades of Hessians and the 42nd Highlanders, under the command of General Philip von Heister moved into position at the Flatbush Pass. Those actions were intended to keep the Patriots busy while the main body of the British army moved through the one mountain pass unguarded by the Americans.

   The Jamaica Pass, the easternmost of the mountain passes, was left unguarded, save for five men; and it was through that gap in the mountain that General Howe led the main body of the British army during the night of 26 August.

   At about 1:00 am on 27 August, 1776 a volley of gunfire broke the night stillness as the British troops under Grant fired on sentries stationed near the Red Lion Inn along the Gowanus Road. The main body of Stirling's men were sleeping when the firing began. They were roused from their slumbers and hurriedly formed into ranks. One of those men wrote of the experience:

"About ƒunriƒe... we came up with a very large body of them. The Delaware and Maryland battalions made one party. Colonel Atlee with his battalion a little before us had taken poƒt in an orchard and behind a barn; and on the approach of the enemy he gave them a very ƒevere fire, which he bravely kept up for a conƒiderable time, until they were near ƒurrounding him, when he retreated to the woods.
 
"The enemy then advanced to us, upon which Lord Stirling drew us up in a line and offered them battle in the true Engliƒh taƒte. The Britiƒh army then advanced within about three hundred yards of us and began a very heavy fire from their cannon and mortars, for both the balls and ƒhells flew very faƒt, now and then taking off a head. Our men ƒtood it amazingly well ... Our orders were not to fire until the enemy came within fifty yards of us; but when they perceived we ƒtood their fire ƒo cooly and reƒolutely they declined coming any nearer, although treble our number."

   Colonel Samuel J. Atlee, mentioned in the above, gave his own account of the battle. Atlee was the commander of the Pennsylvania Musketry Battalion, a part of Colonel Samuel Mile's Rifle Regiment. He submitted this account of the portion of the battle in which he took part to the Pennsylvania Executive Council on 16 November, 1779.

"This morning before day, the Camp was alarmed by an attack upon the Pickett, ƒtationed upon the lower Road leading to the Narrows, commanded by Major Burd of the Pennƒylv'a flying Camp. About day light a part of Lord Sterling's Brigade, to wit: Col. Smallwood's, Col. Haƒlett's, part of Lutz's & Kirhline's Flying Camp, and part of mine, in the whole about 2,300 men, under the Command of Maj. Gen. Sullivan and the Brigadiers, Lord Sterling and Parƒons, march'd to ƒupport the Pickett attacked by the enemy. About 1/2 after ƒeven the enemy were diƒcovered advancing, about 2-1/2 miles from the lines at Brookline, in order - their field Artillery in front. This proved the left wing of the Britiƒh Army, the 4th & 6th Brigades, compoƒed of the following Regiments: the 17th, 23d, 40th, 42d, 44th, 46th, 55th, 57th and 64th under the Command of Major General Grant.
 
"I then rec'd orders from L'd Sterling, with that part of my Battalion in the Field, to advance and oppoƒe the Enemy's paƒsing a moraƒs at the Foot, a fine riƒing Ground upon which they were drawing up, and give him time to form the Brigades upon the Heights. This order I immediately obeyed, expoƒed without any kind of Cover to the Enemy's Fire of Artillery charged with Grape. We ƒuƒtained their Fire untill the Brigade was form'd. I then filed off to the Left and took poƒt on a fine woody eminence on the left of the Brigade.
 
"My troops juƒt poƒted, when I received a Reinforcement of 2 Companies from the Delawares, with orders to file off further to the Left, and prevent, if poƒsible, a large detachment of the enemy from turning the Left of the Brigade. Upon filing off to the Left, according to the orders rec'd, I eƒpied, at the Diƒtance of about 300 yards, a Hill of Clear Ground, a proper ƒituation to oppoƒe the Regiments endeavoring to flank us; which hill, I determined, if poƒsible, to gain before them, judging they were likewiƒe making for it. On marching up the Hill, and within about 50 yards of the ƒummit, we unexpectedly rec'd a heavy Fire from the Enemy taken poƒt there before me, notwithƒtanding the forced march I made. Upon receiving the heavy Fire, my detachment, under a continued and exceeding warm Fire of the Enemy, formed in order.
 
"The 2 companies of the Delaware Reg't, excepting the Lieuts. Stewart & Harney, with about 16 privates, broke, and had nearly drawn after them the whole of my detachment. This cauƒed a moment's Halt, but the Officers & men recovering from the ƒurprize at receiving ƒo rough & unexpected a ƒalutation, upon receiving my orders to advance, immediately obeyed, with ƒuch Reƒolution that the Enemy, after a ƒevere Conflict of a few minutes, left me maƒter of the Hill, leaving behind them a Lieut. and ƒix privates wounded, and fourteen privates killed. My troops, fluƒh'd with this advantage, were for puƒhing after the flying Enemy, but perceiving at about 60 yards from the Hill we had juƒt gain'd, acroƒs a Hollow way, a Stone Fence lined with wood, from behind which we might be greatly annoyed, I ordered not to advance but maintain the poƒseƒsion of the Hill, (which anƒwered at thie Time every neceƒsary purpoƒe.) The order was immediately obeyed, when we found by a heavy Fire from the Fence that it was lined as I expected. The Fire was as briƒkly returned by my brave Soldiers. The Enemy finding it too hott and our fire too well directed, retreated to and joined the Right of this wing of their army. In this ƒevere conflict I loƒt my worthy Friend and Lt. Col. Parry, whom, in the midƒt of the action and immediately after he fell, I ordered to be bourn by four Soldiers off the Field into the Lines at Brook Line. The Enemies ƒituation here was ƒo advantageous that had they been markƒmen, and directed their Fire with judgement, they might have cut off the greateƒt part of my detachment, I having left, for the ƒecurity of my Right Flank and to protect my Rear in caƒe of Retreat, a Company in a Wood upon my Right. After this firƒt Attack which continued in the whole for about 15 minutes, we brought from the field ƒuch of their wounded whom I judged might be aƒsiƒted, and about 25 ƒtand of Arms. The wounded I placed in my Rear under the Shade of ƒome Buƒhes, it being intencely hott; the arms I diƒtributed to ƒuch of my ƒoldiers as were the moƒt indifferently arm'd, and the wounded Lieut. taken at our firƒt gaining of the Hill I ƒent to L'd Sterling by a Drum & Fife. He died on the way. After placing the proper Guards, I ordered my fatigued ƒoldiers to reƒt themƒelves. We continued in this ƒituation about 20 minutes, when the Enemy was diƒcover'd marching down to make a ƒecond attempt for the Hill. Both officers and ƒoldiers immediately flew to arms, and with remarkable coolneƒs and reƒolution ƒuƒtained and returned their Fire for about 10 minutes, when the Enemy were obliged once more to a precipitate flight, leaving behing them, Killed, Lt. Col. Grant, a number of Privates, and great many wounded. These wounded not mortally, I likewiƒe removed into my rear; one I ƒent to L'd Sterling that had rec'd a wound in the leg. I ƒent my Adjutant to his Lordƒhip, with an acc't of my ƒucceƒsive advantages, to know his lordƒhip's further orders and to requeƒt a Re-inforcement. My Adjutant returned with 2 Companies of Riflemen of the flying Camp, who remain'd with me a few minutes, being ƒoon order'd to rejoin their Corps. Very luckily, after this ƒecond engagement, an ammunition Cart belonging to Col. Huntington's Reg't arrived at my poƒt, of which we ƒtood in great need, having entirely exhauƒted our ammunition and fired many rounds from that taken from the Enemy every time we had the good fortune to beat them off the Field. The officers were extremely alert, and from the ammunition ƒo opportunely arrived, ƒoon ƒupplied their men with ƒufficient Stock to ƒuƒtain another attack, ƒhould the Enemy think proper to make it. They did not ƒuffer us to wait long. In about half an Hour we were alarm'd of their appearance the third Time.
 
"The eagerneƒs of the Officers and Soldiers to receive them deƒerves me warmeƒt acknowledgements and thoƒe of their Country. They were received as uƒual, and as uƒual Fled after a warm conflict of about 10 or 12 minutes. I now determined to purƒue by obƒerved a Reg't which proved to be the 22d or Royal Highlanders coming down to ƒuƒtain the Royal Runners who were the 23d and 44th. I halted, prepared to receive them likewiƒe, but the drubbing their Friends had ƒo repeatedly received, I believe, prevented them, and they ƒeemed ƒatiƒfyed with protecting the refugees and conducting ƒuch as were able to the army.
 
"Major Burd, who was taken at the attack of the Pickett on the Right, and was at Gen'l Grant's Quarters during the above ƒeveral attacks, informed me after each great number of Officers and Soldiers came in wounded.
 
"I fully expected, as did my Officers, that the ƒtrength of the British Army was advancing in this Quarter with intention to have taken this Rout to our Lines, but how greatly were we deceived when intellingence was received that the Center, composƒed of the Heƒsians and the Right wing, were rapidly advancing to our Rear, and that we were nearly ƒurrounded.
 
"This we were ƒoon convinced of by an exceeding heavy Fire about a mile in our Rear, no Troops being in that Quarter to oppoƒe the march of this Grand Body of the Britiƒh Army but Col. Miles, 2 Battalions of Rifle men, Col. Willis's Reg't of Connecticut, and a part of Lutz's Battalion of Penn'a Flying Camp.
 
"I once more ƒent my Adjutant to Lord Sterling to acquaint him with my laƒt ƒucceƒs and for further orders, but receiving no anƒwer and after waiting for the Enemy more than half an hour, they not approaching in Front, thoƒe in the Rear drawing very near, I judged it moƒt prudent to join the Brigade, where I migth be of more ƒervice than in my preƒent ƒituation. I therefore ordered a march, leaving the Field, Killed, Lt. Col. Grant and upward of ƒixty men and great number wounded, beƒide thoƒe taken at Sundry times into my Rear. The World may judge my ƒurpriƒe when coming to the Ground where our Brigade had been drawn up, to find they had gone off without my receiving the leaƒt intelligence of the Retreat or orders what to do.
 
"I cou'd, I doubt not, with conƒiderable loƒs, have made my retreat, but perceiving at a diƒtance , near the water, the Rear of our Troops and at the ƒame time a Body of the Enemy advancing toward them, who proved to be the Britiƒh Grenadiers, commanded by Col. Monckton, theƒe were attacked by a few brave fellows. Not able to prevent them I ordered my Fatigued party once more to advance and take poƒseƒsion of a poƒt and Rail Fence, at the Foot of a riƒing Ground over which the Grenadiers were moving with great rapidity. The Timely aƒsitance brought theƒe few brave fellows by a party this day, often try'd and as often victorious, encouraged thoƒe already engaged and obliged the Grenadiers to quit the ground they had gain'd and retire to a fence lined with wood. Here we kept up a Cloƒe and conƒtant Fire for upwards of a Quarter of an Hour, untill the Brigade had retreated our of our Sight. Our ammunition now again entirely ƒpent and our Retreat after the Brigade effectually cut off, I was then obliged to file off to the Right with what men I cou'd collect and endeavor to find a way out in that Quarter.
 
"After various Struggles, running thro' the Fire of many of the Enemy's detachments, and nearly fatigued to death, not having eat or drank ƒince the day before about 4 O'Clock in the afternoon, no alternative preƒenting, I was oblliged to ƒurrender to the 71st Highlanders, having with me about 40, officers included. About 5 O'Clock arrived at Gen'l Howe's Quarters, receiving as we paƒsed thro' the right wing of the Britiƒh Army. The moƒt opprobrious and ƒcurrulous Language."

   While the Right Wing was engaged with Grant's attacks, retreats and counterattacks, the Center was under a constant, but largely ineffectual bombardment by the Hessian artillery. And also, in the meantime, as described by Colonel Atlee, the main body of the British Army had made their way through the Jamaica Pass and were closing in on the Patriots from their rear.